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view of the world as an irreconcilably hostile division between the two of them and the
alliances they had.
Maybe both sides are beginning to view that as a bankrupt vision-a vision that has
cost both sides enormous blood and treasure, that neither side has gained very much
out of, and that has allowed both sides to neglect the enormous problems within their
own borders. It may be that again, as in the immediate postwar period, we are approaching the beginning of a search for common interests, common ends, and common rules of the game that we can endorse in their own terms rather than as
instruments of our personal or limited or parochial ends.
I spoke about the use of force, drugs, terrorism, and the environment, which are
obviously impossible to address from a national interest perspective. Professor Boehm
said that we ought to be thinking about how we can get the Bush Administration up to
snuff on these issues. One thing I might suggest for review is Gorbachev's letter of
September 1987 in which he listed a lot of problems, and purported to be prepared to
engage in international efforts through international organizations new and old, to
address those problems, including the ones that you mentioned. One thing that might
help the Bush Administration, the United States, and perhaps the rule of law in the
world would be to go down that letter systematically and engage Gorbachev on each
of those proposals-which I agree are vague and unspecific. But we do have the
power to engage on those proposals and force serious, sustained, and detailed attention to each of those subjects. I think we may be at a point where that kind of approach would generate enormous gains for all of us. We actually may be in a "predawn" of a new push for international law in the true sense, rather than as an instrument of national policy.
RACHEL DE LA VEGA*

Reporter
GENOCIDE: THE CONVENTION, DOMESTIC LAWS, AND STATE
RESPONSIBILITY
The panel was convened by its Chair, Cherif Bassiouni,** at 8:30 a.m., April 7,
1989.
REMARKS BY CHERIF BAssiouNI

The topic of genocide is a topic that deserves not only occasional consideration but
I would say constant reconsideration. The reason is that in some 315 international
instruments of international criminal law, covering approximately 22 international
crimes, we find a wide ranging number of instruments on specific crimes. For example, we have 59 instruments covering the crimes against peace, 49 instruments covering war and crimes related to war activities. We now have 13 conventions in the area
of international traffic in drugs, and 26 conventions on slavery and slaverylike practices. We have one single lonely convention on genocide.
Not that this Genocide Convention has been successful in eliminating the practice
of genocide. Rather, what has been demonstrated in the course of time is that the
Genocide Convention, which was really the culmination of what was believed to be a
*Editorial Assistant, InternationalLegal Materials.
**Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.

needed international instrument after Nuremberg, is woefully deficient in dealing with
the subsequent practices that history has uncovered. In fact, the Genocide Convention as it starts out emphasizes that the extermination of a group on a particular basis--religion or race-becomes an international crime when the killing of even a single
individual is accompanied by the intent to eliminate the entire group "in whole" or
"in part." Thus, the key to it is not the numerical aspects of the atrocity, but the
accompanying intent.
The Convention further eliminates from the definition social groups, or political
groups, which, at the time, the delegation of the Soviet Union was quite careful in
excluding. It is clear from subsequent events that mass killings and mass exterminations have continued to occur. For example, Biafra, Bangladesh, and Kampuchea
demonstrate that we are speaking of a significant increase in numbers, over and above
the one-million figure in each of these conflicts. Yet the Genocide Convention does
not apply to these mass killings because of the intent requirement. While international
criminal law conventions have evolved in many different areas, there has been no
evolution in the area of genocide.
One of the explanations I offer, based on my research, may well be that the Genocide Convention, unlike others, has not created an international bureaucracy. The
ILO, or the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the several bodies dealing
with narcotics, are all bureaucracies that have an interest in perpetuating their existence; they always find opportunities for the development of new and improved international instruments. With genocide nobody thought of creating an international
bureaucracy that would have an interest in self-perpetuation and in the development
of further instruments. We have in fact developed no mechanism whatsoever under
international law specifically related to the Convention which could have at least
brought some further attention to the subject. For all practical purposes, we also do
not have an international constituency interested in that particular area; and I am
speaking particularly of an international bureaucratic constituency.
In the last 15 years, the United Nations has produced only one report of any particular significance dealing with genocide. There are occasional references to it in some
of the works of the Commission on Human Rights or its subcommittee but nothing as
significant and as constant as, for example, references to apartheid. With all due consideration to the significance of the crime of apartheid and the abhorrent nature of the
practice, it would seem to me that if we were to quantify the amount of effort, attention, paper, and ink spilled over apartheid in the last 20 years, in contrast to that
which has been expended over genocide with all of its manifestations, the less significant numerically (but certainly not less significant humanistically) has received disproportionate attention. With that, therefore, I think it is important for us to
reconsider what is to happen in the area of genocide, and mass killings, and to consider the eventual development of new international instruments, as well as new international bureaucracies, to use the many modalities that international organizations
have developed to monitor infractions, disseminate information, and to build up the
constituency for the prevention of this type of behavior.
More specifically, in the United States, after many years, the Genocide Convention
was finally ratified with reservations and declarations that to a large extent limit its
application. After a 2-year period, implementing legislation has put it into effect, also
with a great deal of limiting effects. We will, therefore, hear about the Convention,
the implementing legislation, means of enforcing the Convention (of course, very limited in scope), and finally some broader policy comments in closing.

May I point out that, from an international criminal law point of view, there is
something to be considered in the area of the linkage between crimes against humanity
as it developed in connection with the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials and
their subsequent absorption into the Genocide Convention; that is, whether or not the
notion of crimes against humanity continues to exist as a general principle of international law irrespective of genocide. I would strongly advocate that it does and that it
should, because clearly the Genocide Convention does not incorporate the entire
meaning of what crimes against humanity did incorporate either under article 6(c) of
the London Charter or under what one would hope to see as the evolution of the
general principles of international law in connection with that subject.
REMARKS BY JORDAN PAUST*

I have tried to maintain the observational standpoint of an objective scholar who
nevertheless shares certain commitments to human dignity, and I believe, perhaps like
my fellow panelists, that there is much to celebrate-not the relatively recent efforts of
the U.S. Senate and our last President, but the general recognition, today at least, that
genocide is a crime under customary international law, a crime over which there is
universal enforcement jurisdiction and responsibility. One can celebrate also the
achievement of a common expectation that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of customary international law, ajus cogens, allowing no form of derogation under domestic or treaty-based law. Further, it is commonly understood that the
definition of genocide contained in the Convention defines that which is prohibited by
customary jus cogens.
Nonetheless, during a remarkable effort in the U.S. Senate to gain advice and consent to ratification of the Genocide Convention, attempts were made openly either to
kill ratification of the treaty or to gut the treaty of any meaningful effect. As Senator
Jesse Helms admitted, for example, his "chief object" was to "protect" the United
States "from interference by an internationalregime of law." While providing its advice and consent in 1986, the Senate retained the Lugar-Helms-Hatch proviso, which
seeks to redefine genocide in a manner substantially at odds with the Convention and
thus also withjus cogens. It is evident, however, that the apparent attempt to substantially limit the terms and applicability of the Genocide Convention is impermissible
and comes too late. First, the attempted "understanding" is fundamentally incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and will thereby be legally unacceptable.
Second, the attempt to redefine genocide in such a radical manner has been obviated
by the development of customary international law independent of a long, abnegative
effort of the Senate to allow the United States to participate in the treaty process.
Part of the radical effort to gut the Convention of any functional criminal effect
hinged upon a blatant attempt unilaterally to rewrite article II of the Convention. In
particular, the treaty phrase "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part," appears in
the Senate's 1986 "understanding" as "[with] the specific intent to destroy, in whole or
in substantialpart." The phrase "specific intent" actually is appropriate under the
circumstances, but the threshold element of the crime of genocide would be shifted by
the last portion of such language from the treaty's lower threshold of intent to destroy
a relevant group "in part" to the Senate's nearly impossible threshold of intent to
destroy a relevant group "in substantial part."
One can imagine the type of defenses that the Senate's "understanding" might permit. For example, is a nuclear incineration of all the Jews in and around the state of
*Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.

Israel to be excused under such an "understanding" merely because a "substantial
part" of the Jews of the world were not targeted? If Hitler himself had been prosecuted under the Senate's present version, a defense to what the world knows as acts of
genocide might have been: "Yes, I attempted to exterminate Jews as such and
thousands, even millions, of Jews, but I never had the specific intent to destroy a
'substantial' part of such a group, nor could I or my followers have done so-we never
had control of even half the Jews of the world." Or take the putative defense of a
member of the KKK in the United States: "Sure, I intended to exterminate as many
blacks as I could get my sights on, but I never had more than 2,000 in my gun sights
and never had the intent to destroy a 'substantial' part of such a group, nor could I
physically do so." Even nationwide conspirators in the KKK, each responsible for
the known acts of co-conspirators might defend: "We never intended to kill more
than six million blacks and thus never intended to kill a 'substantial' part of the blacks
in the United States, much less in the world." It is evident, therefore, that U.S. prosecutors (under the Senate's present "understanding") would have a nearly impossible
burden of proving an intent to destroy a relevant group "in substantial part." When
half the persons within a large group were not even targeted by an accused, how could
a prosecuting attorney prove that there was an intent to destroy a "substantial part" of
such a group? If the phrase "substantial part" could theoretically include just more
than one-third, one-fourth, or 10 percent, why would we even want such threshold
quotas set against what the world still knows as acts of genocide? As Professor Bassiouni has noted, the significant evil involved (and the fundamental difference between
murder and genocide) hinges not upon percentages of group extermination, but upon
the singling out of victims because they are members of a certain group--the targeting
of members of a group as such. And that evil is not merely against a particular group
or its members. In the long run it involves an attack upon our common dignity, an
attack upon us all.
The Senate also attempted to rewrite section b of article II of the treaty. The treaty
prohibition of an intent to cause "serious... mental harm to members" of a relevant
group would be changed by the present Senate "understanding" to an intent to cause
"pennanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar techniques." Thus, it would be possible for alleged terrorists or Nazi war criminals to
defend their actions with proof of the fact that intense fear or anxiety produced in the
primary victims was not intended to be "permanent" but temporary. Indeed, how
burden of proving beyond a reasonable
would prosecutors meet the even more difficult
doubt that an intent existed not merely to cause "serious" but "permanent" mental
harm? It might also be alleged by an accused that specific terroristic tactics utilized
did not equate with "torture or similar techniques" because the primary victims were
never captured or under the control of the accused. Here again, U.S. prosecutors
would be at a serious disadvantage, and the object and purpose of the Convention
would be needlessly thwarted.
Even more incredible was a 1987 bill in the House of Representatives designed supposedly "to implement" the Genocide Convention. A definitions portion of HR 807
would have redefined "substantial part" to mean "a part of a group of such numerical
significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the
group as a viable entity." How would a U.S. prosecutor prove such an element? If 95
percent of a group of 35 million men, women, and children was brutally and systematically exterminated at the hands of some nationwide conspirators, would a defense be
that the remaining 5 percent, now even more unified in its group identification and
determination, was never targeted and still constitutes a viable entity? Under such a

definition, must "the group as a viable entity" be exterminated or an intent to do so be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt before genocide recognizably exists? Hitler's defense under such a definitional scheme would have been stronger, and so would that of
any future exterminators of racial, religious, national, or ethnic groups as long as they
intend to leave some "viable" portion of the group or it cannot be proven that they did
not. Frankly, I have never heard of a more ludicrous, if not egregious, effort at drafting an "implementation act." There can be no doubt that adoption of the putative
definition of "substantial part" in HR 807 would be fundamentally incompatible with
the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention and leave the U.S. effort at meaningful adherence to the treaty and customary international law a laughable disgrace.
Equally ridiculous was the requirement in H.R. 807 that the offense either be "cornmitted within the United States" or be perpetrated by a U.S. national. When the
offense occurs abroad, such a requirement could leave the United States unable to
fulfill its obligation under customary international law either to exercise universal enforcement jurisdiction or to extradite in a case where the United States is unable to
extradite a foreign accused pursuant to a constitutionally required extradition treaty.
The alternative requirement, that the alleged offender be "a national of the United
States," further complicates our ability to implement the Genocide Convention and
customary obligations with respect to international crime, while possibly leaving U.S.
prosecutors unable to prosecute foreign nationals who commit acts of genocide against
our own people abroad. What supposed political benefit exists from excepting acts of
genocide committed against U.S. nationals by foreign perpetrators is difficult to imagine, but it remains evidence of a pitifully myopic, parochial effort at international
criminal law enforcement. It invites criticism and would leave the United States, at
the start of its third century, unable to lead the effort against genocide, a result that
must not be allowed.
On April 14, 1988, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary completed consideration
of its version of the bill and reported favorably to the ful Senate. S.1851 followed
nearly lockstep the egregious portions of H.R. 807. The phrase "substantial part" was
added to a draft of section 1091(a), and in section 1093(8) it was further redefined
with the same "destruction of the group as a viable entity" threshold found in H.R.
807. It also contained the needlessly limiting phrase "permanent impairment of the
mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques" in section 1091(a)(3). Moreover, there was no change from the policy-thwarting portions of section 1091(d) of H.R. 807, which would make it possible to prosecute
under the draft legislation only if the offense is committed within the United States or
the alleged offender is a U.S. national, thus still leaving uncovered acts by non-U.S.
perpetrators and thus still functioning as Nazi exemption clauses. On October 14,
1988, S.1851 was passed by the Senate without amendment. The House also passed
S.1851 on October 19, without amendment, thus leaving our legislative effort to punish all acts of genocide incomplete. President Reagan simply signed the legislation on
November 4, 1988, and deposited the instrument of ratification with the United Nations on November 25, 1988.
It is evident that the Senate's 1986 "understanding" should be changed. The present understanding would clash so seriously with the ordinary meaning of the terms of
the treaty, as well as its object and purpose, that it could not survive a good faith,
legally appropriate interpretation of the treaty. As an attempted "reservation" the
Senate's "understanding" would be legally unacceptable since it is incompatible with
the object and purpose of the Convention. Further, such an "understanding" cannot
be legally operative in the face of a contraryjus cogens, which is the case here.

In my opinion, the President should have refused the present "advice and consent"
of the Senate and sent the treaty back for a new "understanding." The Senate could
have changed its contemptible understanding with respect to article II of the Convention before ratification by the President and perhaps now, even afterward, if it is recognized that a Senate "understanding" as to a mere interpretation of a treaty does not
so condition its consent to ratification as to nullify the constitutional process of ratification post hoc when its "understanding" and "consent" change. It may even be
recognized that subsequent legislation, with at least two-thirds approval by the Senate,
functionally (and constitutionally) could serve the same purpose, but these are partly
uncharted areas of constitutional process.
In any event, Congress should pass adequate implementing legislation, dropping
any reference to "substantial part" or "permanent" mental harm. In fact, Congress
could pass new legislation incorporating article II of the Genocide Convention by
reference, as it has with respect to so many international crimes, and thus avoid the
unacceptable thresholds and deviant definitional element contained, for example, in
H.R. 807 and S. 1851. With respect to new legislation, it would not matter whether
Congress attempted to implement the treaty if it is recognized that Congress was also
exercising its power under article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution to define
and punish "Offenses against the Law of Nations" of a customary nature evidenced in
part by definitional portions of such a treaty. Further, the Congress, while implementing customary international law, would not be bound by any prior Senatorial proviso
to advise and consent to the ratification of a treaty. Thus, whether or not the Senate
can change its "understanding" of a treaty as such, the Senate's new viewpoint can
find expression in legislation designed in part to implement a customary prohibition of
genocide. Changes could even occur later through amendment to legislation defining
and punishing the international crime. In this sense, there is room for constant refinement and interplay by the House, Senate, and executive with respect to legislation
implementing customary international law.
Additionally, there are significant powers of the judiciary at stake. Not only does
the federal judiciary have the ultimate authority to identify, clarify, and apply treaties
in cases properly before the courts, but it has the same general authority and responsibility with respect to customary international law. Indeed, in the case of unavoidable
clash between a federal statute and customary international law, especially customary
jus cogens, the more widely shared and authoritative preference is that customary international law prevail. Under the primacy of the customary international law approach, clearly the definition of genocide evidenced in article II of the Convention
should prevail in the face of deviant legislative provisions such as those found in H.R.
807 and S. 1851. An independent judiciary, applying customary law, could thereby
assure a more meaningful role for the United States in the enforcement of international law.
Such an approach is recognizably available with respect to civil sanctions, since
customary international law is directly incorporable for such purposes. But is customary international law also enforceable directly for criminal sanction purposes, or must
there be federal legislation defining and punishing a relevant offense against the law of
nations? It is generally assumed that a federal statute is needed, even though prosecutions for violations of international law had occurred early in our history in the absence of domestic implementary legislation. Yet the question arguably remains,
especially since seemingly relevant Supreme Court opinions on the need for a federal
statute merely denounced criminal prosecutions based on common law alone and,
although customary international law has been said to be "part of" the common law,

it is not merely "common law" but much more and of a higher transnational status
with a recognizable constitutional base. Thus, it is possible that the customary prohibition of genocide is still directly enforceable in our courts despite the lack of relevant
domestic legislation or the existence of any inconsistent definitional elements in legislation designed in part to implement the Convention.
It is also arguable that domestic legislation is not needed in order to prosecute
treaty-based acts of genocide. Some have assumed that treaties are inherently nonselfexecuting for criminal sanction purposes, but the better view is that treaties can be
self-executing for such purposes. Congress merely has a concurrent power to define
and punish offenses against international law, not an exclusive power at the expense of
the treaty power and that of the judiciary, which are also constitutionally based. If so,
violations of the Genocide Convention could be prosecuted upon ratification whether
or not there is adequate implementing legislation. Assuming that such legislation is
not needed, generally unacceptable definitional elements contained in legislation could
even be ignored.
In any event, the better approach to a legally permissible and responsible adoption
and implementation of the Genocide Convention lies with a change of the Senate's
1986 "understanding." The Senate should conform its unjust understanding to the
patent language and the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. If such does
not occur voluntarily, the new President should withdraw our "ratification" of the
treaty and send the treaty back to the Senate. If not, one can predict that the U.S.
"ratification" would be legally unacceptable as contrary to the object and purpose of
the treaty and to customaryjus cogens. If so, the United States will not be bound by
the treaty, and its overall effort at ratification could be subject to ridicule. Given the
development of a customary prohibition of the crime of genocide, efforts to gut the
treaty of any meaningful effect have simply come too late and should be abandoned.
Who among us would deny that prior and present victims of the Nazi holocaust,
indeed any genocidal acts abroad, were and are human beings? It is time finally, really
to ratify the Genocide Convention and to pass legislation adequate to our international criminal law enforcement responsibilities.
Professor BASsIouNI: Thank you, Professor Paust, for a very imaginative constitutional approach to both the interpretation of the Constitution and the relationship
between treaties, implementing legislations, and the powers of the judiciary. I think
there is much to consider in the proposals you have made. I suppose this is an attempt
to achieve through more of an activist judiciary what the legislature and the executive
have failed to accomplish. I was particularly fascinated with your thought of the
possibility of recalling the deposit of the instruments of ratification. I think that if that
is an acceptable procedure, I would much rather recall the whole Genocide Convention and start all over again. But it seems to me that we are witnessing two interesting
phenomena throughout the world. Somehow it seems that legislation like the implementing legislation on the Genocide Convention and the Canadian statute on prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity is focused toward the past and reflects
more of a political statement on the part of legislative bodies referring to past experiences than a genuine effort to develop a legal instrument reflecting the present and,
one hopes, applying to the future.
In most of these cases, while great emphasis is laid on the atrocious experiences of
World War II, somehow, when one reads the legislative history of these instruments,
events that have occurred between 1945 and now seem to be almost completely ignored. There is very little reference in those legislative debates about contemporary

events, and this is very noticeable if one recalls the earlier observation of Professor
Paust respecting the "substantial" destruction of a group.
It also seems to me that there is a more insidious purpose in this type of legislation,
whether it is the U.S. legislation or the Canadian legislation. The insidious purpose is
to pass the legislation so that politicians can say we have it, but in fact to draft it in
such a way that it is totally impossible to carry out.
In the Canadian legislation, specifically with respect to crimes against humanity,
such a crime must have existed at the time the alleged crime occurred. Thus, anything
pre-Nuremberg is going to have to be proven to have existed under customary international law general principles. This makes it almost impossible, for example, to deal
with the question of deportation of one's nationals to another country. I am currently
working with the Canadian Government on the first test case that will start this June,
and I can assure you that the difficulties of trying to find a way to show that the
principles of international law existed at that time with respect to the deportation of
one civilian population to an allied country is not an easy task. I am therefore more
concerned that this type of implementing legislation undermines the legitimacy of general principles of international law, customary law, and the conventions that have
developed, since it removes some of the strong foundations that we thought had been
built over time.
REMARKS BY WILLIAM

M. HANNAY*

I am standing in the shoes, so to speak, of Professor Robert Friedlander, who was to
have been on this panel today. He has the unique characteristic of having been one of
the few witnesses to the 1985 hearings on the Genocide Convention to testify in opposition to it. I feel bound, because of my role in standing in for him, to respond to some
of the things that Professor Paust has said and to put into context the concerns that
were raised by some of those who opposed the Convention. I will limit my remarks in
that regard to those of Professor Friedlander's views with which I am familiar and
those of Senator Helms, who was a very strong opponent of the Convention as initially
drafted.
There was much opposition to the Convention in the U.S. Senate for many years
because of a difference in perception as to what the Convention was intended to accomplish. If the Convention was nothing more than a strong statement of policy, a
symbol of the nation's opposition to the concept of genocide, life would have been
much easier in terms of ratification. The United States, as you know, signed the Convention. Indeed, the United States was the very first state that signed it; yet it took a
long time for our country to ratify it. Why? Because many people, including a majority of Senators, believed that it should be more than a symbol. They believed that it
should be applied with the same type of consistency and specificity that any statute
passed by the Congress would have to exhibit. So the debate went on for a number of
years.
As a member of the American Bar Association, I am somewhat embarrassed to say
that the Association opposed the Convention for the first 27 years of the Convention's
existence, because of what a number of Association members perceived to be serious
constitutional problems with it. They perceived a real conflict between our constitutional structure and the nature of this convention. If you perceive the Convention to
be more than just a symbol---something that actually has to be applied in real lifethere is arguably a lot of vaguenesses to it, a lot of inconsistencies in it. To spell out
*Adjunct Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; of the Illinois Bar.

how the Convention would work in practice presented, in the minds of many people in
the American Bar Association, some constitutional problems.
In 1974, the American Bar Association reversed its position on the Convention and
went from being its strongest opponent to the strongest proponent of the Convention.
For the next 12 years the American Bar Association was in the forefront of supporting
the Convention.
Why did opposition to the Convention remain in the Senate? Was it some sort of
conspiracy to allow future Nazi murderers to go free? Certainly not. That was certainly not the basis of the opposition in the Senate.
There were several objections to it. Viewed as a statute that both a prosecutor and a
defense attorney would have to use, and that a judge would have to construe, vagueness needed to be resolved. So, for example, with respect to the phrase "in whole or in
part," the Senate ultimately attached an understanding that the term "substantial
part" needed to be read into the statute. Otherwise, it would have dangerously overbroad application. The real fear of many opponents was not that the Convention
would be applied to the kind of action that we can all agree is horrible, but that it
would be misused and abused as a tool of propaganda by those who oppose the United
States and other free countries. They feared that it would be used to our disadvantage,
that we would be accused of acts of genocide unfairly and falsely. Nations like Israel
indeed have been accused of acts of genocide unfairly and falsely. Indeed, we can see
this happening even now.
Recently, there was introduced before the American Bar Association, for consideration at the 1989 Annual Meeting, a resolution that the application of capital punishment in the United States is genocide in contravention of the Genocide Convention. I
consider that to be a preposterous proposition. There are many reasons for opposing
capital punishment, but the argument that it is a genocide under the Convention is not
one of them. Yet, now that the Convention has been ratified, it is being used against
us and our laws. Precisely because this kind of abuse might occur, and in order to
prevent such abuse, the Senate attempted to define and narrow the Convention's application. Of course, as we know, the Genocide Convention, with or without American
ratification, has not stopped the genocide that has occurred in the countries that Professor Bassiouni has mentioned. This, of course, is a great tragedy, but there is one
comment from the Senate Report that I wanted to read. In its explanation regarding
the understandings, one of the things the Senate report said was the following, and I
think it is something that should be kept in mind:
[O]ver the years, the true meaning of the word genocide has been debased. The
charge of genocide has come to be levelled against virtually any action with
which the accuser disagrees. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish legal scholar, coined the
term to describe what was happening to Jews in the Nazi-occupied Europe. His
purpose was to focus the outrage of all civilized people on the commission of such
atrocity. The Committee hopes its own actions will help restore the meaning
Lemkin intended. 1
So, while Professor Paust has, in good faith referred to the "contemptible understandings" of the Senate, the "deviant definitions," and the "unjust understandings"
of the Senate, there is more to those understandings than deviance and unjustness.
There was a deep concern on the part of many Senators, ultimately adopted by the
Senate as a whole, that there were vaguenesses and inconsistencies in the Genocide
Convention. The Senate felt that, if it were to be applied-and they want it to be
IS. Rep. No. 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).

